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Encryption schemes often derive their power from the properties of the underlying algebra on the symbols
used. Inspired by group theoretic tools, we use the centralizer of a subgroup of operations to present a private-
key quantum homomorphic encryption scheme that enables a broad class of quantum computation on encrypted
data. A particular instance of our encoding hides up to a constant fraction of the information encrypted. This
fraction can be made arbitrarily close to unity with overhead scaling only polynomially in the message length.
This highlights the potential of our protocol to hide a non-trivial amount of information, and is suggestive of a
large class of encodings that might yield better security.
The discovery that quantum systems could be harnessed to
process data in a fundamentally new way has led to the bur-
geoning field of quantum information processing. This ap-
proach to computation holds the promise of more efficient al-
gorithms for a variety of tasks including integer factorization
[1], search [2] and quantum simulation [3]. However, quan-
tum information processing has also found applications in the
area of cryptography, which has been a focus of the field since
the discovery of secure quantum key distribution protocols by
Bennett and Brassard [4], and Ekert [5]. The information the-
oretic security of these protocols stands in stark contrast to
the reliance of classical key agreement protocols on assump-
tions of computational hardness, and indeed a major goal of
quantum cryptography research is to replicate and extend the
functionality present in existing classical schemes while pro-
viding stronger, information theoretic, security guarantees.
In the world of classical cryptography, a central topic in re-
cent years has been the study of homomorphic encryption [6–
8]. Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption which
allows data processing to be performed on encrypted data
without access to the encryption key. In general, a homo-
morphic encryption system is composed of four components:
a key generation algorithm, an encryption algorithm that en-
crypts the data using the generated key, a decryption algo-
rithm that decrypts the data using the key, and an evaluation
algorithm which is used to process the data without decryp-
tion. Thus homomorphic encryption allows for secret data to
be processed by third parties without allowing them access to
the plaintext. After decryption, the plaintext output reveals
the processed data. A scheme is termed fully-homomorphic if
it allows for arbitrary processing of the encrypted data. Al-
though the idea for homomorphic encryption has existed for
some time [6], it was not until 2009 that a fully-homomorphic
encryption scheme was discovered by Gentry [7]. Gentry’s
scheme is only computationally secure, relying on the as-
sumed hardness of certain worst-case problems over ideal lat-
tices, and the sparse subset sum problem, although the condi-
tion requiring ideal lattices was later dropped [8].
Recent successes in quantum cryptography in finding infor-
mation theoretically secure protocols for blind computation
[9–14] and verifiable computing [15–18], problems closely
linked to homomorphic encryption, have motivated the ques-
tion of whether quantum mechanics allows for information
theoretically secure homomorphic encryption schemes. In-
deed, a number of attempts have been made to find a quantum
analogue of homomorphic encryption [19–22], however these
attempts have inevitably run into a barrier. It is now known
that it is not possible to achieve perfect information theoretic
security while enabling arbitrary processing of encrypted data,
unless the size of the encoding is allowed to grow exponen-
tially [23]. As a result, such schemes have required inter-
action between parties to enable deterministic computation.
These requirements parallel those of blind quantum compu-
tation which hides both the data and the computation being
done on it. The question then remains as to whether informa-
tion theoretically secure homomorphic encryption is possible
without expanding the definition to include interactive pro-
tocols. A first step in the direction of non-interactive quan-
tum protocols was presented in [24] for a restricted model
of quantum computation known as the BosonSampling model
[25] which is non-universal. Furthermore, the scheme ensures
only that the encoded information and the accessible informa-
tion differ by an amount proportional to log2m bits when m
bits are encrypted, which is a relatively weak security guaran-
tee. An information-theoretically secure scheme that allows
for processing of encrypted data beyond BosonSampling is
not known to date.
In this paper, we present a private-key homomorphic en-
cryption protocol that supports a broad class of computations,
including and extending beyond BosonSampling, while pro-
viding information theoretic security guarantees. The pro-
tocol we present ensures a gap between the information ac-
cessible to an adversary and actual information encoded that
grows as m log2(d/m) +m(log 2)
−1 bits when m log2 d bits
are encrypted using m d-level systems. This is a significantly
stronger security guarantee than that offered by the scheme
presented in [24]. We present our results in three parts. First
we present a general approach to homomorphic encryption
stemming from the group theoretic structure of quantum oper-
ations. We then present a family of operations which allow for
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2a broad class of computations to be performed on encrypted
data for a range of encryption schemes satisfying certain sym-
metry constraints. Finally we present a concrete encoding sat-
isfying these constraints and show that it limits the accessible
information as described above.
Group theoretic approach — We approach the problem of
creating a homomorphic encryption scheme via the most naive
route: we try to construct a set of encryption operations which
commute with the operations used to implement computa-
tion on the encrypted data. However, this approach immedi-
ately encounters a barrier when applied to the case of univer-
sal computation. In such a case the computation operations
form a group, either the unitary group in the case of quan-
tum computation or the symmetric group in the case of classi-
cal reversible computation, which does not usually commute
with other operations. Indeed, any irreducible representation
of these groups only commutes with operators proportional
to the identity, precluding non-trivial encryption. However,
for reducible representations of these groups, there can exist
non-trivial operators which commute with the entire group.
This provides a natural route to constructing a homomorphic
encryption scheme which allows the evaluation of operators
chosen from some group G on encrypted data, by choosing a
representation of the group with a non-trivial centralizer. The
set of operations used to perform the encryption must be cho-
sen as a subset of this centralizer. While it is not immediately
obvious that encryption operations chosen this way should ac-
tually be able to hide information, the BosonSampling scheme
presented in [24] provides an example of such an encoding
where a non-trivial amount of information is hidden.
Representation of computation — Our protocol uses m
identical bosonic particles; each particle has a spatial degree
of freedom limited to a finite number of modes x = 1, . . . ,m
and an internal state α = 0, . . . , d− 1 (see Fig. 1). We design
our scheme such that the encryption operations affect only the
internal states of the particles, and the computation operations
affect only the spatial modes of the particles. Since the input
to the computation is supplied using the internal states of the
particles, but the computation is performed using manipula-
tion of only spatial modes, it may appear that the input does
not affect the computation. This is not the case, however, since
the internal states of the particles affect the computation by al-
tering interference between particles.
Each particle can be represented as a state |α〉x created
out from a vacuum state |vac〉 via a creation operator aˆ†x,α,
with |α〉x = aˆ†x,α |vac〉. The bosonic creation operators aˆ†x,α
and aˆ†y,β commute, and satisfy the orthogonality condition
[ax,α, a
†
y,β ] = δα,βδx,y . Note that we make no assumption
on the internal states of the m particles, any two particles can
have the same or different internal states. Explicitly, the initial
state of our scheme is
aˆ†1,α1 . . . aˆ
†
1,α1
|vac〉 = |α1〉1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |αm〉m,
which we denote as |α〉 for short, whereα = (α1, . . . , αm) ∈
Zmd is our plaintext. Since the values of α1, . . . , αm are se-
lected from the integers from 0 to d− 1, there are dm possible
orthogonal input states, spanning a complex Euclidean space
(Cd)⊗m.
The set of computation operations that we are allowed to
perform is isomorphic to a unitary group of a large dimen-
sion. The state space of m identical bosons can be expressed
as a symmetric subspace of a Hilbert spaceHm = Hinternal⊗
Hspatial, whereHinternal andHspatial denote the space for the
internal degrees of freedom and the spatial modes of the m
identical bosons respectively. Due to the indistinguishability
of the bosons, the state of the system is invariant under per-
mutation of particles, and hence the system can only occupy
states within the subspace of Hm which respect this permu-
tational symmetry. The computational operations, which act
only on Hspatial, must respect this symmetry, and hence the
infinitesimal generators of the group of such operations are
permutation-invariant. We proceed to elucidate the structure
of these infinitesimal generators. Each boson can be in one of
m possible spatial modes, and hence there are m2 generalized
Pauli operators each of dimension m that act non-trivially on
the spatial degree of freedom of each boson. Let the corre-
sponding Hermitian and non-Hermitian generalized Pauli op-
erators constitute the sets Bi and B′i respectively. Let C′i ⊂ B′i
such that |C′i| = |B
′
i|
2 and every element in B′i is either in or
proportional to the Hermitian conjugate of some element in C′i.
The Hermitian set Bi = Bi∪{P+P † : P ∈ C′i}∪{i(P−P †) :
P ∈ C′i} then comprises of m2 infinitesimal generators of
the unitary group operating non-trivially only on the spatial
modes on the i-th boson. The infinitesimal generators of
group of computation operations are then symmetric sums of
them-fold tensor product of elements from Bi, with each such
element corresponding to one boson. The number of such
symmetric sums is exactly the number of ways to distribute
m indistinguishable spatial labels (because of the requirement
of permutation-invariance) amongm2 distinct elements of Bi,
which is
(
m2+m−1
m
)
. Hence the set of computation operations
G that we can perform is isomorphic to a unitary group of
dimension at least
(
m2+m−1
m
) ≥ (m2)mm! ≥ mmem−1/√m.
Contained within G are unitaries generated by the follow-
ing infinitesimal generators:
Ĉx,y :=
d−1∑
α=0
aˆ†x,αaˆy,α ,
for 1 ≤ x, y ≤ m. These operators Ĉx,y are infinitesimal gen-
erators for operations that are equivalent to beam-splitters for
x 6= y, and phase-shifters for x = y in the quantum optics set-
ting. Since we can generate the phase-shifters and the beam-
splitters as in [26], these infinitesimal generators generate a
dimensionm unitary group isomorphic to U(m) [27–29] from
which the evaluator’s computation operations can be chosen.
These are the same elements used to construct those of the
BosonSampling model. All particles in the BosonSampling
model are indistinguishable (have the same internal states);
the particles in our model however need not be indistinguish-
able, because each particle can be chosen as a d-level system
3independently. If we were to filter out particles with one of the
d internal states, we are left with a system that is equivalent
to d− 1 BosonSampling models by linearity of passive linear
optics. This is a generalization of the insight used to encrypt
BosonSampling instances in [24].
Hence our computation space includes a hard sampling
problem as a special case. However, it is currently unknown
whether our model allows for encoded universal computation
on a space of size exponential in m.
Encoding scheme — For the encryption operation, a unitary
operator E , is applied to the internal state of the m particles as
is depicted in Fig. 1. Since E only acts on the internal states of
the particles, provided that it operates identically on all parti-
cles, it commutes with our computation operations that act
trivially on the internal states of the particles. In this section,
we give a specific choice E which enables non-trivial hiding
of information.
In what follows, we drop the spatial labels of the particles
and make them implicit. We define the computational basis
states of each particle to be |α〉 for α = 0, . . . , d − 1, and
define the discrete Fourier transform on Cd as
F =
d−1∑
α,β=0
1√
d
exp
(
2piiαβ
d
)
|β〉〈α|.
Denote the basis states of Cd in the Fourier transform ba-
sis as |αF 〉 = F |α〉, and define the trigonometric terms
cα(k) = cos(2piαk/d) and sα(k) = sin(2piαk/d) for arbi-
trary integers α and k. The generators of the encoding are, for
k = 1, . . . , bd2c,
∆̂k =
L̂k + L̂−k
2
=
d−1∑
α=0
cα(k)|αF 〉〈αF |,
∆̂k+b d2 c = −
L̂k − L̂−k
2i
=
d−1∑
α=0
sα(k)|αF 〉〈αF |,
where L̂ is the cyclic shift operation on the internal state of
each particle such that L̂ |α〉 = |α+ 1(mod d)〉. To simplify
our calculations, we choose to express our generators in the
following basis instead:
Ĥ` =
1
d
I− η`∆̂b d2 c +
b d2 c∑
k=1
(
2c`(k)∆̂k + 2s`(k)∆̂k+b d2 c
) ,
where η` =
1+(−1)d
2 cos(`pi). It is easy to verify that in the
Fourier transform basis, Ĥ` = |`F 〉〈`F |.
Data represented using the logical basis can be encrypted
by choosing a key, κ = (κ1, . . . , κd−1), where each κ` is an
integer chosen uniformly at random from the non-negative in-
tegers {0, . . . ,m}, and applying the random unitary operation
E on each particle, where
E = exp
(
d−1∑
`=1
iφ`Ĥ`
)
,
evaluator
FIG. 1: This figure shows Alice’s encoding scheme for m bosonic
particles each in one of d internal states. Each particle has a spa-
tial degree of freedom labeled by x. The encoding operation E is
effected across the particles in a tensor product way. The evaluation
operation is taken from the group G, which acts non-trivially only on
the spatial modes of the m bosons, and can put multiple bosons in a
single spatial mode. Post-evaluation, the encryption is removed via
the inverse encoding operation to reveal the evaluated plaintext.
and φ` = 2pim+1κ` are the secret random angles. It is conve-
nient to think of E as a product of integer powers of E` =
exp(iĤ`
2pi
m+1 ), so that E = Eκ11 . . . E
κd−1
d−1 .
After the encoding, computation can still be performed on
the encrypted data using the operations described in the pre-
vious section. However, for an adversary that does not have
access to κ, the information encoded is obscured. Once the
evaluation is completed, the output can be decrypted by ap-
plying E† on every particle to yield the processed plaintext.
Surprisingly, with this simple encryption-decryption process,
any quantum computation chosen from G which is performed
on the encrypted state yields the same result when decrypted,
as if it were performed on the unencrypted state. The result
is an encryption scheme that admits privacy homomorphisms
for operations chosen from G.
Our scheme works because the encryption operators affect
only the internal states of the particles at each site, while the
computation leaves the internal states of every particle invari-
ant. In the particular encryption scheme we have chosen, the
encryption operators generate an abelian group A that acts
trivially on the spatial modes. Hence the evaluator can per-
form operations in the tensor product of the group G and the
abelian group A.
Hidden information — Here we show that our quantum ho-
momorphic scheme can hide a number of bits proportional
to m. Without knowing the key, the ensemble is {ρˆα, pα}
where α = (α1, α2, . . . , αm) denotes the plaintext, and the
corresponding encrypted state is
ρˆα =
1
(m+ 1)d−1
m∑
κ1,...,κd−1=0
E⊗m |α〉 〈α|(E†)⊗m .
It is illuminating to look at the ensemble in the Fourier trans-
form basis as here the encoding is diagonal. We can write ρˆα
in the form
∑
β,β′∈Zmd cβ,β′ |β〉 〈β
′| and the non-zero coeffi-
cients are those for which the number of `’s in β is equal to
the number of `’s in β′ for all ` = 1, . . . , d − 1. Let F(Oˆ)
4denote (F †)⊗mOˆF⊗m. Then
F(ρˆα) = 1
dm
∑
β,β′∈Zmd
e−
2piiα·(β−β′)
d |β〉 〈β′|×
d−1∏
`=0
δ(wt`(β)− wt`(β′)) , (1)
where wt`(β) is the Lee weight which counts the number of
times ` appears in the vector β. The non-zero terms in eq. (1)
can be partitioned into sets labeled by integer partitions of m.
Let Pm,d be the set of integer partitions of m into d (possi-
bly empty) parts and let λ be a partition in Pm,d. In eq. (1),
strings for which all Lee weights are equal belong to the same
partition λ. The entries in λ = (λ0, λ1, . . . , λd−1) give the
number of times a particular element appears in β. With this
notation, we get
F(ρˆα) = 1
dm
∑
λ∈Pm,d
Rλ |Ψαλ 〉 〈Ψαλ | ,
where Rλ =
(
m
λ0, λ1, . . . , λd−1
)
is the multinomial coeffi-
cient, and
|Ψαλ 〉 =
1√
Rλ
∑
β:wtj(β)=λj
j=0,...,d−1
e−
2pii
d α·β |β〉 ,
which is invariant under permutation of the particles.
Theorem 1: For all probability distributions pα over plain-
texts α, the accessible information of the encoding, without
knowing the key, is upper bounded by log2m! bits when Al-
ice sends m d-level particles.
Proof: First, we observe that the elements of {|α〉 , α =
0, . . . , d − 1} are related by powers of L̂. Since L̂ is unitary
and commutes with the encoding E , it must be that S(ρˆα) is
the same for all α. For simplicity, we analyze S(ρˆ0):
S(ρˆ0) = S(F(ρˆ0))
= S
 ∑
λ∈Pm,d
Rλ
dm
|Ψ0λ〉 〈Ψ0λ|

= H
({
Rλ
dm
})
+
∑
λ∈Pm,d
Rλ
dm
S
(|Ψ0λ〉 〈Ψ0λ|)
= H
({
Rλ
dm
})
, (2)
where we have used the orthogonality of the different parti-
tions labelled by λ in third equality [30], and that |Ψ0λ〉 〈Ψ0λ|
has rank one in the final equality. Similar arguments can be
made for ρˆ =
∑
α pαρˆα,
S(ρˆ) = S
 ∑
α∈Zmd
pα
∑
λ∈Pm,d
Rλ
dm
|Ψαλ 〉 〈Ψαλ |

≤ S
 ∑
α∈Zmd
1
dm
∑
λ∈Pm,d
Rλ
dm
|Ψαλ 〉 〈Ψαλ |

= H
({
Rλ
dm
})
+
∑
λ
Rλ
dm
S(
∑
α
1
dm
|Ψαλ 〉 〈Ψαλ |). (3)
The inequality above occurs because applying a channel that
randomizes over α, by applying a random power of L̂ to each
particle, symmetrizes the probability distribution pα to the
uniform distribution, but cannot decrease entropy. The sec-
ond term of eq. (3) obeys the identity
1
dm
∑
α∈Zmd
|Ψαλ 〉 〈Ψαλ | =
1
Rλ
∑
β:wtj(β)=λj
j=0,...,d−1
|β〉 〈β| , (4)
and is hence a maximally mixed state in the partition labeled
by λwith a rank ofRλ, with entropy at most maxλ log2Rλ ≤
log2m!. Using these facts and putting eqs. (2)-(4) together,
we obtain a bound on the Holevo quantity of
χ({ρˆα, pα}) ≤ log2m! (5)
which in turn bounds the accessible information.
When m is large,
χ({ρˆα, pα}) ≤ m log2m−
1
log 2
m+O(log(m)) .
and the gap, between the encoded information and the infor-
mation accessible to an adversary, is at least
Γ = m log2 d− χ({ρˆα, pα})
≈ m log2(d/m) +m(log 2)−1 .
Thus if d = m and m log2m bits are encoded, this gap
scales at least proportional to m. Moreover if d = m1/r
for r in the open unit interval, the gap asymptotically ap-
proaches m(1 − r). This is a significantly stronger security
than that offered by [24], while at the same time significantly
extending the functionality by allowing computations beyond
BosonSampling to be performed on the encrypted data, thus
bringing us closer to the goal of achieving a quantum fully
homomorphic encryption scheme. As our bound in eq. (5) is
independent of the probability distribution used for the encod-
ing, the bound on the accessible information holds even if the
a priori distribution on the plaintext is not uniform.
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